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Public health agencies and other groups have invested considerable resources in automated surveillance systems over the last decade.
These systems generally follow syndromes in pre-diagnostic data drawn from sources such as emergency department visits. A main goal
of syndromic surveillance systems is to detect outbreaks rapidly and the number of studies evaluating outbreak detection has increased
recently. This paper reviews these studies with the goal of identifying the determinants of outbreak detection in automated syndromic
surveillance systems. The review identiﬁed 35 studies with 22 studies (63%) relying on naturally occurring outbreaks and 13 studies (37%)
relying on simulated outbreaks. In general, the results from these studies suggest that syndromic surveillance systems are capable of
detecting some types of disease outbreaks rapidly with high sensitivity. The determinants of detection included characteristics of the sys-
tem and of the outbreak. Inﬂuential system characteristics included representativeness, the outbreak detection algorithm, and the spec-
iﬁcity of the algorithm. Important outbreak characteristics included the magnitude and shape of the signal and the timing of the
outbreak. Future evaluations should aim to address inconsistencies in the evidence noted in this review and to identify the potential inﬂu-
ence of other factors on outbreak detection.
 2006 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.
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Over the last decade, public health agencies and others
have invested substantial resources in the development
and operation of automated systems for syndromic surveil-
lance [1–5]. These systems monitor pre-diagnostic data
drawn from sources such as emergency department visits
and sales of pharmaceuticals. While syndromic surveillance
systems may be eﬀective for many purposes, a main pur-
pose of these systems is usually to detect disease outbreaks
rapidly.
Given that outbreak detection is a fundamental reason
for conducting syndromic surveillance, public health per-
sonnel need to understand how well syndromic surveillance
systems accomplish this goal. The relevant question from a1532-0464/$ - see front matter  2006 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.
doi:10.1016/j.jbi.2006.09.003
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E-mail address: david.buckeridge@mcgill.capublic health perspective is not simply whether syndromic
surveillance can detect an outbreak, but rather what are
the determinants of outbreak detection when using syn-
dromic surveillance. In other words the people who must
decide whether to install a syndromic surveillance system
and those who must operate the systems need to know
the most inﬂuential factors of system performance.
A recent systematic review noted few published evalua-
tions of syndromic surveillance systems [6]. More recently,
however, the evaluation of outbreak detection through syn-
dromic surveillance has received considerable attention. A
working group established by the CDC released evaluation
guidelines for these systems recently [7] and the number of
published studies of outbreak evaluation has increased
over the last few years.
The goal of this paper is to review studies that have eval-
uated outbreak detection through automated syndromic
surveillance. The speciﬁc aims are to summarize the
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and to examine the merits of diﬀerent methods for evaluat-
ing outbreak detection. Public health surveillance is a pro-
cess that includes many actions other than analysis to
detect outbreaks, including identifying cases, gathering
data, and guiding decisions about public health actions.
While it is never possible to isolate fully one component
of the overall surveillance process from the other compo-
nents, the focus of this review is to synthesize research ﬁnd-
ings related to outbreak detection. The paper is intended to
inform further research on outbreak detection and to pro-
vide public health practitioners with a summary of
evidence for one aspect of syndromic surveillance.
2. Methods
The scope of the review included studies that evaluated
the use of routinely collected, pre-diagnostic data for out-
break detection. To be included in the review, a study
had to apply an outbreak detection algorithm prospectively
to syndromic data. In other words, the evaluator had to
make an alarm decision at a given time using only data col-
lected prior to that time. The rationale for this inclusion
criterion was to ensure that the approach to surveillance
evaluated in a study could be reproduced in public health
practice. Studies were excluded, therefore, if they used data
that were diagnostic, or data that were acquired through
active or manual collection. In addition, studies were
required (1) to compare syndromic data to some ‘gold stan-
dard’ data with known outbreaks, or (2) to inject simulated
outbreaks into the syndromic data. Any system description
without evaluation was therefore excluded, as were studies
that relied on wholly simulated data, and studies that did
not apply an outbreak detection algorithm. There had to
be a reproducible decision rule for declaring an outbreak.
These criteria excluded studies that compared syndromic
data to other data sources through cross-correlation anal-
ysis. Finally, to ensure that the evaluated data were still
likely to be available in practice, only studies published
within that last 20 years were considered.
An initial set of studies was identiﬁed through a recent
systematic review of syndromic surveillance systems [6].
For each of the studies in the systematic review, PubMed
was searched using the Related Articles feature and the
100 articles most similar to each study in the systematic
review were considered for inclusion in this review. The
Related Article feature uses a variant of the cosine similar-
ity method to identify other articles with similar terms in
the title, abstract or keywords [8]. PubMed was also used
to search for eligible studies using the query ‘‘‘syndromic
surveillance’ AND (evaluation OR test).’’ Literature
searches were conducted in April of 2006. Online resources
were also consulted, including the www.syndromic.org
Internet site, which is maintained by the International Soci-
ety for Disease Surveillance, and the annotated bibliogra-
phy published by the Centers for Disease Control and
Prevention (http://www.cdc.gov/epo/dphsi/syndromic/index.htm). All papers published in the proceedings of
the syndromic surveillance conferences between 2001 and
2004 were also reviewed manually for eligibility. Finally,
the references in all studies included in this review were
examined and considered for inclusion.
3. Results
3.1. Descriptions of studies
The search identiﬁed 35 studies described in 34 pub-
lished articles [9–42]. Table 1 summarizes the studies in
terms of their general characteristics, which are presented
below.
3.1.1. Study setting
Studies tended to be set in metropolitan areas in the
United States, but some were from France, England and
Canada. There was a trend towards increasing numbers
of studies over time with the majority of studies published
in 2004 or later. Records from emergency department visits
were analyzed most commonly (16 studies, 46%), but data
from OTC sales (8 studies, 23%) and ambulatory visits (8
studies, 23%) were also used in some studies. Data were fre-
quently grouped into a syndrome that reﬂected a respirato-
ry (19 studies, 54%) or gastrointestinal illness (12 studies,
34%), with most of the studies of gastrointestinal illness
(12 of 13 studies) relying on naturally occurring outbreaks
for evaluation. There was no consistent approach across
studies to grouping records into syndromes.
3.1.2. Outbreak signals in test data
Most studies (22 studies, 63%) used naturally occurring
outbreak signals to evaluate outbreak detection, while a
smaller number relied on simulated signals (13 studies,
37%). Both types of studies tended to rely on a small
amount of authentic data for the evaluation (Fig. 1), with
most using under 2 years of data. In studies where authors
relied on naturally occurring outbreaks the tendency was to
evaluate detection of annually occurring respiratory or gas-
trointestinal outbreaks. These outbreaks appear in syn-
dromic surveillance time series as a gradual increase in
incidence over weeks or months with a peak incidence
many times larger than the baseline incidence at other
times of the year (Fig. 2). In studies where authors used
injected signals, the tendency was to model the signal after
an anthrax outbreak or a mathematical function, such as a
step-function or an exponential distribution (Table 2). The
methods used to simulate signals ranged from simple math-
ematical functions to more complex stochastic simulation
models with more recent studies tending to rely on more
detailed models.
3.1.3. Outbreak detection algorithms
Most of the studies (24, 69%) used temporal detection
algorithms only, while the remaining studies used spatial
or space–time detection algorithms (Table 3). All studies
Table 1
Summary of studies
Author Year Syndromic data Location Syndrome
Naturally occurring outbreaks
Marx et al. [23] 2006 ED visits, Absenteeism, OTC NYC GI
Kulldorf et al. [22] 2005 ED visits NYC Diarrhea
Das et al. [12] 2005 OTC NYC ILI, GI
Chen et al. [11] 2005 Prescription pharmaceuticals NY State Macrolides
Ritzwoller et al. [34] 2005 Ambulatory visits Denver, CO ILI
Yih et al. [42] 2005 Ambulatory visits Minneapolis, St. Paul, MN GI
Balter et al. [9] 2005 ED visits NYC GI
Fleming et al. [14] 2004 Ambulatory visits England, UK Asthma
Heﬀernan et al. [17] 2004 ED visits NYC Respiratory, Fever, GI
Siegrist and Pavlin [36] 2004 Ambulatory visits, OTC, Prescription pharmaceuticals USA Respiratory, GI
Edge et al. [13] 2004 OTC SK, ON Gastrointestinal
Hogan et al. [18] 2003 OTC PA, IN, UT Electrolytes
Irvin et al. [19] 2003 ED visits Detroit, MI Anthrax
Ivanov et al. [20] 2003 ED visits Utah Respiratory, GI
Mostashari et al. [25] 2003 Ambulance dispatches NYC ILI
Mostashari et al. [26] 2003 Dead bird reports NYC Death
Weber and Pitrak [41] 2003 ED visits Chicago, IL Potential WNV
Goldenberg et al. [15] 2002 OTC Pittsburgh, PA Cough and cold
Harcourt et al. [16] 2001 Nurse hotline calls England, UK Respiratory, ILI
Tsui et al. [38] 2001 ED visits Pittsburgh, PA Respiratory, ILI
Quenel and Dab [29] 1998 Prescription pharmaceuticals Paris, France Respiratory
Rodman et al. [35] 1998 Nurse hotline calls Milwaukee, WI Diarrhea
Simulated outbreaks
Wang et al. [40] 2005 ED visits Boston, MA Respiratory
Wallstrom et al. [39] 2005 OTC Washington, DC Gastrointestinal
Kleinman et al. [21] 2005 Ambulatory visits, ED visits Boston, MA Respiratory
Buckeridge et al. [10] 2005 Ambulatory visits Norfolk, VA Respiratory
Nordin et al. [27] 2005 Ambulatory visits Minneapolis, St. Paul, MN Respiratory
Miller et al. [24] 2004 Ambulatory visits Minneapolis, St. Paul, MN ILI
Ozonoﬀ et al. [28] 2004 ED visits Boston, MA URI
Reis and Mandl [31] 2004 ED visits Boston, MA Respiratory
Stoto et al. [37] 2004 ED visits Washington, DC ILI
Reis and Mandl [30] 2003 ED visits Boston, MA Respiratory
Reis and Mandl [32] 2003 ED visits Boston, MA All visits
Reis et al. [33] 2003 ED visits Boston, MA All visits
Goldenberg et al. [15] 2002 OTC Pittsburgh, PA Cough and cold
ED, emergency department; OTC, over-the-counter pharmaceuticals; GI, gastrointestinal; ILI, inﬂuenza-like illness; URI, upper respiratory tract
infection; and WNV, West Nile virus.
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one study that considered concurrent surveillance of three
data sources [36]. The majority of studies applied a decision
rule daily (28 studies, 80%), although some analyzed the
data weekly (6 studies, 17%) or monthly (1 study, 3%).
Most studies conducted a temporal analysis using a regres-
sion method that modeled daily counts for a single surveil-
lance data source. Statistical process control methods were
used more frequently for analyses of weekly or monthly
counts. Methods used for spatial and space–time analyses
were varied, but a scan statistic was used most frequently.
3.2. Evaluation of outbreak detection using natural outbreaks
Most studies that relied on natural outbreaks reported
that surveillance using syndromic data tended to detect
the signals seen in the comparison data, often immediately
before, or near the beginning of the signal detected in the
gold standard data source. For example, one authorreported an alarm from surveillance of outpatient clinic
visits for asthma in the same week as an unusual surge in
pollen counts [14]. Another author reported that an alarm
from surveillance of the incidence of calls to a nurse hotline
for inﬂuenza-like illness occurred in the same week as an
increase in inﬂuenza isolates in the community [16].
Five studies examined detection performance on a num-
ber of outbreaks suﬃciently large to report quantitative
measures of sensitivity and timeliness [9,18,20,26,36]. The
authors of a study of over-the-counter electrolyte sales
reported that weekly temporal surveillance of these data
had sensitivity and speciﬁcity of 100% for the three season-
al outbreaks at ﬁve geographic locations, as compared to
surveillance of pediatric hospital admissions for outbreaks
of gastrointestinal infections [18]. This ﬁnding is diﬃcult to
generalize to detection of smaller, sporadic outbreaks
because the authors set the decision threshold for the Expo-
nentially Weighted Moving Average (EWMA) method to 9
standard deviations above the mean, and an algorithm with
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Fig. 1. Number of years of baseline data used in evaluation studies.
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breaks. In a similar study, the same authors compared free-
text chief complaints from ED visits to hospital admissions
for surveillance of respiratory and gastrointestinal out-
breaks [20]. They reported that using a EWMA algorithmR
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Fig. 2. Example data from ambulatory physician visiwith a threshold 8 standard deviation above the mean
detected all 3 gastrointestinal outbreaks with no false
alarms. For the 3 respiratory outbreaks, the authors
required a threshold of 13 standard deviations above the
mean to detect all outbreaks with perfect speciﬁcity.
Another study examined simultaneous surveillance of
three data sources for respiratory and gastrointestinal out-
breaks with the gold-standard determined through expert
review of the data [36]. The authors reported that the medi-
an time to alarm for the best detection algorithms was the
ﬁrst day of the outbreak with a speciﬁcity of 98% (1 false
alarm every 6 weeks) and a sensitivity per outbreak of
100% (8 of 8) for respiratory outbreaks and 88% (6 of 7)
for gastrointestinal outbreaks. The authors of this study
also compared the performance of diﬀerent outbreak detec-
tion algorithms and they noted considerable diﬀerences in
the accuracy and timeliness of outbreak detection between
algorithms. Wavelet and EWMA-based algorithms had the
best performance. Nearly all of the signals in this study
were annually occurring outbreaks, with the notable excep-
tion of one gastrointestinal outbreak presenting as a sud-
den spike, which was missed by most algorithms.
A third study, which examined surveillance of dead
birds, reported that spatial analysis by census tract identi-
ﬁed clusters of humans with West Nile virus (WNV) an
average of 12 days before the onset of human illness and
17 days before diagnosis of human illness [26]. SensitivityApr Jul Oct Jan Apr Jul Oct Jan Apr
2001 2002 2003
Apr Jul Oct Jan Apr Jul Oct Jan Apr
2001 2002 2003
thed Count, 28 day window
ts for respiratory and gastrointestinal syndromes.
Table 2
Characteristics of simulated signals used in evaluation studies
Author Year Signal shape Signal duration Signal magnitude
Signal modeled after speciﬁc disease
Wang et al. [40] 2005 Multinomial, Linear, Exponential 7 days 5–50% of mean baseline
Wallstrom et al. [39] 2005 Historical outbreak 5 weeks 0.1–10% of population infected
Kleinman et al. [21] 2005 Model output Various 1015 anthrax spores
Buckeridge et al. [10] 2005 Model output Various 1–16% of population infected
Nordin et al. [27] 2005 Model output Various Various
Miller et al. [24] 2004 Historical outbreak 43 days 5–200% of mean baseline
Goldenberg et al. [15] 2002 Linear 3 days 0–200% range of baseline data
Signal modeled after mathematical function
Ozonoﬀ et al. [28] 2004 Step 1 day 17–34% of mean baseline
Reis and Mandl [32] 2003 Step 7 day 4–22% of mean baseline
Reis and Mandl [30,31] 2003, 2004 Step 7 days 10–50% of mean baseline
Stoto et al. [37] 2004 Linear 3, 9 days 30–300% of mean baseline
Reis et al. [33] 2003 Step, linear, exponential 3, 7, 14 days 4–33% of mean baseline
Table 3
Outbreak detection algorithms used in evaluation studies
Author Year Temporal Spatial Algorithm
Natural
Weber and Pitrak [41] 2003 Monthly Region Historical mean
Fleming et al. [14] 2004 Weekly Region Historical mean
Edge et al. [13] 2004 Weekly Region SPC (MA, Cusum)
Hogan et al. [18] 2003 Weekly Region SPC (EWMA)
Tsui et al. [38] 2001 Weekly Region Regression (Serﬂing)
Quenel and Dab [29] 1998 Weekly Region Regression (SARIMA)
Harcourt et al. [16] 2001 Weekly Sub-region (call centers) Regression (GLM binomial)
Marx et al. [23] 2006 Daily Region Regression (Serﬂing), Scan (Temporal), SPC (Cusum)
Das et al. [12] 2005 Daily Region Regression (Serﬂlng)
Siegrist and Pavlin [36] 2004 Daily Region Various
Irvin et al. [19] 2003 Daily Region Historical mean
Ivanov et al. [20] 2003 Daily Region SPC (EWMA)
Mostashari et al. [25] 2003 Daily Region Regression, Cyclical regression at set thresholds
Goldenberg et al. [15] 2002 Daily Region Wavelet and AR
Rodman et al. [35] 1998 Daily Region Historical mean
Mostashari et al. [26] 2003 Daily Sub-region (CT) Scan (Spatial)
Chen et al. [11] 2005 Daily Sub-region (County) SPC (Cusum)
Ritzwoller et al. [34] 2005 Daily Sub-region (ZIP) Regression (GLMM) and Scan
Yih et al. [42] 2005 Daily Sub-region (ZIP) Scan (Space–Time with GLMM)
Balter et al. [9] 2005 Daily Sub-region (ZIP) Scan (Space–Time)
Heﬀernan et al. [17] 2004 Daily Sub-region (ZIP) Scan (Temporal and Spatial)
Kulldorf et al. [22] 2005 Daily Sub-region (ZIP, Hospital) Scan (Space–Time Permutation)
Injected
Wang et al. [40] 2005 Daily Region Regression (ARP)
Wallstrom et al. [39] 2005 Daily Region Regression (ARIMA), SPC (EWMA, Cusum)
Buckeridge et al. [10] 2005 Daily Region Regression + SPC (ARIMA and Cusum)
Miller et al. [24] 2004 Daily Region Regression + SPC (AR and Cusum)
Reis and Mandl [31] 2004 Daily Region Regression (ARMA)
Stoto et al. [37] 2004 Daily Region SPC (Shewhart, EWMA, Cusum)
Reis and Mandl [30,32] 2003 Daily Region Regression (ARMA)
Reis et al. [33] 2003 Daily Region Regression + Filter (ARMA and Temporal Filters)
Goldenberg et al. [15] 2002 Daily Region Wavelet and AR
Ozonoﬀ et al. [28] 2004 Daily Sub-region (CT) Various (ARMA, M, Bivariate)
Kleinman et al. [21] 2005 Daily Sub-region (ZIP) Regression (GLMM), Scan
Nordin et al. [27] 2005 Daily Sub-region (ZIP) Scan (Space–Time Poisson)
AR, autoregressive; ARP, autoregressive periodic; ARMA, autoregressive moving average; ARIMA, autoregressive integrated moving average; CT,
census tract; EWMA, exponentially weighted moving average; GLM, generalized linear model; GLMM, generalized linear mixed model; MA, moving
average; SARIMA, seasonal autoregressive integrated moving average; and SPC, statistical process control.
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threshold of a p-value <0.10. In the ﬁnal study, the authors
compared gastrointestinal outbreaks detected through syn-
dromic surveillance of ED visits to gastrointestinal out-
breaks involving P10 people that were identiﬁed through
routine public health measures [9]. Over 3 years, none of
the 49 outbreaks identiﬁed through routine measures were
detected by the ED syndromic surveillance system, but
some of the 236 signals from the syndromic system were
attributed to true outbreaks.
Five studies that relied on naturally occurring outbreaks
reported that they did not detect an outbreak identiﬁed
through the gold standard comparison data. In one case,
surveillance of over-the-counter cough and cold medicine
sales did not detect the start of the inﬂuenza outbreak
[15]. The authors hypothesized that this result may have
been attributable to the inﬂuenza outbreak beginning on
a holiday, and they did not report results for alarms at sub-
sequent points in the inﬂuenza outbreak. In another study,
spatial surveillance of ED visits by hospital location for
diarrhea and vomiting failed to detect an institutional out-
break reported directly to public health [17]. This false neg-
ative was attributed to outbreak cases visiting a hospital
that was not participating in the surveillance system, and
a retrospective analysis indicated that syndromic surveil-
lance would have detected the outbreak had that hospital
been participating in the surveillance system. In a third
study, spatial surveillance of dead birds aggregated to cen-
sus tracts failed to identify WNV in two communities that
experienced conﬁrmed WNV in birds, mosquitoes, and
humans [26]. For one of the communities, the one human
case was attributed to a possible mosquito exposure out-
side of the community. For the second community, the
one human case was a homeless person and the authors
hypothesized he may have been exposed outside of the
community. In the fourth study, temporal surveillance of
the incidence of ED visits for conditions potentially attrib-
utable to WNV failed to detect the emergence of WNV in
the Chicago area [41]. The authors do not speculate why
this outbreak of 500 WNV cases occurring over three
months was not detected. In the ﬁfth study, authors sought
reasons for why syndromic surveillance of ED visits did not
detect any of 49 gastrointestinal disease outbreaks investi-
gated by public health over a 3 year period [9]. In 36 out-
breaks, few or no patients visited an ED and in another
2 outbreaks many of those involved were visitors who left
the region before the onset of symptoms. For the remaining
11 outbreaks, patients visited EDs, but for 3 outbreaks the
EDs were not part of the surveillance system. Other rea-
sons noted for the lack of sensitivity were that outbreak
cases visited EDs over a number of days or weeks, or many
cases were coded using a single record.
Authors reported an empirical estimate of speciﬁcity in
only one study [36]. In that study, experts identiﬁed the
location of outbreaks by visual inspection of the data,
and the authors reported high sensitivity and low timeliness
in the detection of naturally occurring respiratory and gas-trointestinal outbreaks at a speciﬁcity of 98%. Although
authors of other studies did not estimate speciﬁcity empir-
ically, some did report estimates of positive predictive val-
ue. In one study, authors reported that over 80% of alarms
from citywide surveillance of diarrhea and vomiting visits
to emergency departments occurred during outbreaks con-
ﬁrmed by laboratory testing [17]. In the same study, how-
ever, the authors reported that alarms from spatial
surveillance of fever and respiratory visits to emergency
departments occurred with the same frequency during
and outside of inﬂuenza outbreaks. Another study reported
that over 80% of alarms occurring through surveillance of
ambulance dispatches for respiratory conditions occurred
shortly before of during an inﬂuenza outbreak [25]. In
other studies authors reported positive predictive values
ranging from 0% [41] to 50% [19,38], but all of these studies
relied on data with only one outbreak.
3.3. Evaluation of outbreak detection using injected signals
Authors reported sensitivity per outbreak of 100% at
high speciﬁcity (97–99%) for signals with a magnitude from
20 to 300% of the average daily count in the background
data. Miller [24] reported detecting all three injected log-
normal signals on the day when the magnitude of the add-
ed signal was 12% of the daily background with a
speciﬁcity of 98%. Another study using a 3-day step-func-
tion signal [32], reported a sensitivity of 100% at a speciﬁc-
ity of 97% when the signal was 21% of the average daily
background. Similar results were reported for a study using
a 3-day linearly increasing signal, which described detecting
all outbreaks with a magnitude of 36% or more of the daily
background at an undeﬁned speciﬁcity [15].
In contrast to the studies reporting high sensitivity for
smaller signals, some authors reported that a signal with
a larger magnitude was required to detect a large percent-
age of outbreaks [28,37,40]. In the study by Wang, an out-
break signal with a magnitude of 60–80% of the average
daily baseline was required for a sensitivity of 100% at a
speciﬁcity of 96% [40]. In the study by Stoto, a 3-day signal
outside of the inﬂuenza season was not detected with cer-
tainty until it rose to 300% of the average daily background
count [37]. One diﬀerence between the studies reporting
high sensitivity at low signal magnitude and the studies
requiring larger signals was the volume of records in the
baseline data. Authors of studies that reported high sensi-
tivity with proportionally smaller signals used baseline data
with a higher daily mean, approximately 100 records each
day, as opposed to mean daily counts of under 40 and as
low as 3 in one study where larger signals were required
to obtain high sensitivity [37].
Authors of four studies reported the time from onset of
an outbreak until detection [10,21,24,27]. In all cases, the
authors used a simulated anthrax outbreak. Miller report-
ed detection of an outbreak resulting in 308 additional
emergency department visits between 4 and 7 days follow-
ing the release of anthrax [24]. The other authors reported
376 D.L. Buckeridge / Journal of Biomedical Informatics 40 (2007) 370–379earliest detection 2 days following release with the majority
detected within 4 days and nearly all detected within 9 days
of exposure [10,21,27].
Authors examined systematically the impact of signal
magnitude on outbreak detection in nine studies
[10,15,27,28,30,32,33,39,40]. In all of the studies, authors
reported improved sensitivity or timeliness as the signal
strength increased. For example, Ozonoﬀ reported that
doubling the signal magnitude from 17% of the mean daily
baseline (35 counts) to 34% increased the sensitivity of a
time-series algorithm for a 1-day signal from 13% to 29%
[28]. Reis used a step-function signal of 7 days duration
and reported a larger increase in sensitivity per day, from
approximately 15% to nearly 70%, when increasing signal
magnitude from 10 to 30% of the mean daily baseline of
60 counts [30]. Other factors that had the eﬀect of altering
the magnitude of the signal, including the proportion of ill
individuals that seek care [10] and the proportion of the
population covered by the system [27,39] also inﬂuenced
sensitivity.
The inﬂuence of diﬀerent signal shapes on outbreak
detection was examined in three studies [33,37,40]. Stoto
[37] injected 18 additional cases over 3 days (3, 6, and 9)
or over 9 days (1, 1, 2, 2, 2, 3, 3, and 3) to represent ‘fast’
and ‘slow’ outbreaks, and found that the fast outbreaks
were detected more often and more quickly than were the
slow outbreaks. Wang evaluated detection of three signal
shapes, a multinomial distribution patterned after a histor-
ical outbreak, a linear increase in incidence, and an expo-
nential increase in incidence [40]. The multinomial signals
were detected more quickly (70% within 3 days of release),
followed by the linear signals (50% within 3 days) and the
exponential signals (27% within 3 days). Reis [33] examined
linear, exponential and step increases of 3, 7, and 14 days
duration, and reported a diﬀerence in detection perfor-
mance between the diﬀerent signal shapes, but did not
describe the nature of the diﬀerence.
The eﬀect of day-of-week or season on outbreak detec-
tion was examined in ﬁve studies [24,27,28,37,40]. In gener-
al, most authors reported that for a given signal, sensitivity
was higher when baseline counts were lower.Miller reported
that the time to outbreak detection of the same lognormal
signal in records of ED visits for respiratory conditions dif-
fered by season with detection occurring 4 days following a
release in June, 5 days following a release in April, and 7
days following a release in December [24]. Stoto found that
sensitivity for ‘fast’ signals was 100% during the summer and
20% during the winter [37]. Ozonoﬀ reported improved sen-
sitivity on holidays and weekends when the mean count was
15 as compared to weekdays when the mean count was 43
[28]. Nordin noted a similar relationship, with higher sensi-
tivity in the summer and onweek-ends, but observed that the
inﬂuence of season and day-of-week weakened as signal
strength increased [27].Wang assessed overall detection
accuracy, and noted that accuracy of detection was greater
in the winter (90%) than in the summer (77%) and the reason
for this apparently contradictory ﬁnding is not clear [40].The eﬀect of diﬀerent detection algorithms on sensitivity
or timeliness was examined in six studies
[21,28,31,33,37,39]. Two studies led by the same author
examined the inﬂuence of diﬀerent temporal ﬁlters applied
to forecast residuals from a time-series model [31,33]. To
detect a step signal of 7-day duration at a set speciﬁcity,
a 7-day linear ﬁlter applied to regression residuals
enhanced sensitivity over a 1-day ﬁlter (an increase in sen-
sitivity from 30 to 71% for a signal 15% over the mean daily
baseline), and tended to outperform 7-day moving average
and exponential ﬁlters [33]. In another study, authors
examined four statistical process control (SPC) methods
and reported that smoothing algorithms, such as an expo-
nentially weighted moving average or a cumulative sum,
tended to outperform one-day threshold algorithms, espe-
cially for slowly increasing signals [37]. In a study where
both temporal and spatial detection algorithms were com-
pared, the authors demonstrated that a spatial detection
algorithm, the inter-point distance M statistic, had higher
sensitivity than a seasonal time-series model, when clusters
were concentrated in space [28]. For more diﬀuse clusters,
the temporal statistic tended to have higher sensitivity. In
a study that compared two space–time algorithms, a mod-
el-based scan statistics was found to outperform a regres-
sion algorithm [21].
4. Discussion
This review identiﬁed 35 evaluations of outbreak detec-
tion in automated syndromic surveillance systems. The
results from studies that relied on naturally occurring out-
breaks suggest that automated syndromic surveillance can
detect large seasonally occurring outbreaks with sensitivity
and timeliness comparable to or better than systems that
rely on diagnostic data. Results from studies that relied
on simulated outbreak signals also suggest that syndromic
surveillance systems can detect some types of disease out-
breaks rapidly with high sensitivity and speciﬁcity.
The results from the diﬀerent studies are useful for iden-
tifying some of the determinants of outbreak detection. In
other words, the results oﬀer evidence to support which
factors will determine if and when a syndromic surveillance
system will detect an outbreak. To help place the results
from the current study in context, it is helpful to consider
them within a broader conceptual framework for the deter-
minants of outbreak detection. Fig. 3 presents such a
framework that summarizes potential determinants of out-
break detection [7,43–45].
Factors related to baseline and outbreak cases are fun-
damental determinants of detection. The incidence and
variation over time, space and other attributes, of baseline
cases (i.e., cases not attributable to an outbreak) will inﬂu-
ence outbreak detection. In addition, the incidence, varia-
tion and the timing of onset of outbreak cases, and the
relationship between baseline and outbreak factors will
also inﬂuence outbreak detection. For outbreak detection,
the baseline cases can be thought of as the ‘noise’ and the
Fig. 3. A conceptual framework for the determinants of outbreak detection through automated surveillance [7,43–45]. The arrows indicate the ﬂow of
information in the surveillance process.
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is to identify a signal rapidly with high accuracy when the
true distinction between baseline and outbreak cases is not
known. In general terms, outbreaks will be easier to detect
when the incidence and variation of baseline cases are low
relative to the outbreak cases.
Another set of factors relate to the surveillance system
itself. The data source or sources used in a system are
important for their conceptual relationship to an incident
case of disease and the often implicit sampling consider-
ations associated with a data source, including the sam-
pling frame and frequency. Data sources that relate
closely to the incidence of disease and that are collected fre-
quently for a large proportion of the population are likely
to facilitate outbreak detection. The approach taken to
case detection, including the case deﬁnition and the algo-
rithm used to infer if an individual meets a case deﬁnition
are also potential determinants of outbreak detection. Once
cases are identiﬁed, the temporal or space–time algorithm
used to analyze the data and the threshold at which the
algorithm operates may also inﬂuence outbreak detection.
Finally, the public health response to analysis results,
including investigation and response protocols will help
to determine if and when outbreaks are detected.
The determinants of detection noted in this review
include attributes of the surveillance system and attributes
of the outbreak. Characteristics of the system that inﬂu-
enced detection included the choice of data source, the rep-
resentativeness or sampling strategy of the system, the
detection algorithm, and the speciﬁcity or threshold at
which an algorithm operated. Authors of studies using nat-
ural outbreaks noted that some outbreaks were not detect-
ed through surveillance of emergency department (ED)
visits because symptomatic individuals did not visit an
ED. Results from studies using natural and simulated out-
breaks both identiﬁed the representativeness of the system
as an important determinant. Systems that monitored a
larger proportion of the population were more likely to
detect an outbreak. Another inﬂuential system characteris-
tic was the choice of algorithm for analyzing the data.
Studies relying on simulated outbreaks suggest that for
temporal surveillance, an algorithm that considers multipledays of data at each decision-point tend to outperform
algorithms that consider data only from the current day.
As expected, sensitivity tended to decrease as speciﬁcity
increased and the time to detection also tended to increase
as speciﬁcity increased.
Characteristics of the outbreak that inﬂuenced detection
included the magnitude of the signal, the shape of the sig-
nal, and the timing of the outbreak. Studies using naturally
occurring and simulated signals reported consistently that
sensitivity increased and time to detection decreased as
the magnitude of the signal increased relative to the base-
line incidence. The results from simulation studies were
not consistent regarding the magnitude of the signal
required for consistent detection, but in general, signals
with a magnitude of less than 10% of the baseline were dif-
ﬁcult to detect when operating at high speciﬁcity. Some
authors reported detecting signals with a magnitude of
30% over the baseline consistently, while other authors
reported consistent detection only when the magnitude
was closer to 60% over the baseline. One possible explana-
tion for the diﬀerence in results is that signals of a given
percent over baseline may be more diﬃcult to detect with
a low baseline or a high variation around the baseline.
The shape of the outbreak signal inﬂuenced outbreak
detection. Simulated signals that increased in magnitude
quickly over time tended to be detected more rapidly than
slowly rising signals. In naturally occurring outbreaks,
when cases presented over many days, sensitivity was
found to be lower than when cases presented closer in time.
Also, characteristics of the disease process, such as the
duration of the incubation period, were shown to inﬂuence
the sensitivity and timeliness of outbreak detection. These
ﬁndings suggest that caution is warranted in generalizing
outbreak detection results from one type of disease out-
break to another.
The timing of an outbreak inﬂuenced outbreak detec-
tion, but the inﬂuence was not consistent across studies.
All but one of the simulation studies that examined the
inﬂuence of timing found that outbreaks occurring on days
when the baseline count was lower were detected with high-
er sensitivity and timeliness than outbreaks occurring on
days when the baseline was higher. This result is intuitive
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when superimposed on a lower baseline as compared to a
higher baseline. However, the author of one study that
relied on naturally occurring disease outbreaks noted that
a holiday may in practice also decrease the magnitude of
a signal for an outbreak. For example, fewer people may
purchase over-the-counter pharmaceuticals on a holiday
and this type of behavior was not modeled in any of the
simulation studies.
In terms of the methods used to evaluate outbreak
detection, studies that use naturally occurring and simulat-
ed outbreaks both have strengths and weaknesses. Studies
that rely on naturally occurring outbreaks can evaluate
detection only for outbreaks that have occurred and these
studies are usually not able to provide quantitative results.
Evaluation using naturally occurring outbreaks can, how-
ever, produce rich qualitative results that help to identify
practical limitations of outbreak detection and suggest top-
ics for systematic evaluation through simulation. Simula-
tion-based studies allow for greater ﬂexibility and can
produce quantitative results, but generalization from simu-
lated signals to real outbreaks is not straightforward. In
addition, results from evaluation studies are not reported
in a consistent manner and this hampers comparison across
studies.
Other authors have also noted the problem of non-stan-
dard reporting from evaluation studies of syndromic surveil-
lance systems and have suggested adoption of a standard
reporting method [7,46]. At a minimum, reports of evalua-
tion of outbreak detection should describe the system under
evaluation in terms of the characteristics included in Fig. 3.
Given that evaluations using natural outbreaks tend to be
qualitative, reports of these evaluations should pay particu-
lar attention to factors related to the baseline and outbreak
cases and to methods used for data collection. These factors
are also important for simulation studies, although for sim-
ulation studies the model of the outbreak cases should also
be described. In addition, for simulation studies, authors
should report the method used to combine the simulated
and baseline data, the thresholds at which algorithms were
evaluated and the alarm rates that correspond to the thresh-
olds. Authors should also describe clearly the magnitude of
the injected signal over time relative to the baseline incidence.
Methods for reporting timeliness are still being developed,
butmethods that allow for simultaneous examination of sen-
sitivity, speciﬁcity and timeliness may facilitate interpreta-
tion of the results [47].
Finally, it is important to note that the studies identiﬁed
through this review do not provide evidence for many of
the potential determinants of outbreak detection included
in the conceptual framework presented in Fig. 3. This lim-
itation is due, in part, to the scope of the review, but none-
theless, many unanswered questions remain. Additional
fundamental research and evidence synthesis is required
to understand better the inﬂuence on automated outbreak
detection of outbreak and system factors in isolation and in
combination.5. Conclusions
The 35 studies identiﬁed in this review indicate that syn-
dromic surveillance systems are capable of detecting some
types of disease outbreaks rapidly with high sensitivity.
The determinants of performance identiﬁed in this review
include characteristics of the system and the outbreak.
Inﬂuential system characteristics included the representa-
tiveness or sampling approach of the system, the outbreak
detection algorithm, and the speciﬁcity of the algorithm.
Important outbreak characteristics included the magnitude
and shape of the signal and the timing of the outbreak.
Evaluations using natural outbreaks are best suited to
answering qualitative questions, such as why certain out-
breaks are not detected. Simulation of outbreaks is useful
for systematic consideration of the inﬂuence of speciﬁc fac-
tors on outbreak detection and greater consistency in the
reporting of evaluation results would facilitate comparison
of results across studies. Future evaluations should aim to
address inconsistencies in the evidence noted in this review
and to identify the potential inﬂuence of other factors on
outbreak detection.Acknowledgment
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